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Tort Law.  Frazier v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 229 A.3d 56 
(R.I. 2020).  In a personal injury action in Rhode Island the plaintiff 
generally has three years from the date of the injury to file suit, 
otherwise the suit is barred by the statute of limitations.1  However, 
Rhode Island does have a saving statute that can, depending on the 
circumstances, allow a plaintiff to re-file a claim within one year 
after the termination of the original suit.2  Under the saving 
statute, the plaintiff can bring the second claim against the alleged 
tortfeasor’s insurer.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The plaintiff, Timothy Frazier, alleged that, on November 11, 
2013, he fell and was injured in the restroom of a Pizza Hut that 
was owned by Mita Enterprises, LLC (Mita).3  Frazier filed suit 
against Mita on November 2, 2016, and ultimately sought a default 
judgment against Mita when it had failed to respond to the 
complaint.4  Mita later moved to vacate the entry of default and 
dismiss the case on the grounds that Frazier had incorrectly served 
process.5  On August 4, 2017, the first trial justice granted Mita’s 
motions.6  Notably, at this hearing, Mita was represented by 
attorneys “engaged by Liberty Mutual,” Mita’s insurer.7  In July of 
2017, Frazier filed a new complaint against Mita, however, the 
complaint was returned non est inventus.8  Thus, on April 9, 2018, 
Frazier moved to amend his complaint and substitute Liberty 
1. See 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (2012).
2. Id. § 9-1-22.





8. Id.  The term “non est inventus” is Latin for “he or she is not found”
and in law is “[a] statement in a sheriff’s return indicating that the person
ordered arrested could not be found in the sheriff’s jurisdiction.”  BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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Mutual as the defendant.9  Following the amendment Liberty 
Mutual moved to dismiss the new complaint on the grounds that 
the three-year statute of limitations barred Frazier’s action against 
it.10  The second trial justice agreed with Liberty Mutual and 
granted summary judgment in its favor to which Frazier 
appealed.11  
Frazier argued on appeal that the ruling that the claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations was flawed because the trial 
justice was incorrect in holding that the state’s saving statute, 
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-22, did not protect Frazier’s 
action.12  The saving statute provides that if an action is timely 
commenced and is terminated in any manner other than voluntary 
discontinuance, dismissal for failure to prosecute, or a final 
judgment upon the merits, then the plaintiff “may commence a new 
action upon the same claim within one year after the 
termination.”13  The trial justice determined that the savings 
statute did not apply because Liberty Mutual was a “stranger” to 
Frazier’s first action against Mita.14  Frazier, however, argued that 
his claim should have been preserved by the saving statute.15  
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first clarified that it is correct 
that, “deprived [of] the benefit of the savings statute,” Frazier’s 
claim against Liberty Mutual would be barred by the statute of 
limitations.16  This is because, in Rhode Island, an injured party 
has three years to file their suit beginning on the day they are 
injured.17  Here, Frazier was allegedly injured on November 11, 
2013, which meant he could file suit against Mita anytime until 
November 11, 2016.18  However, because the service against Mita 
was returned non est inventus, this gave Frazier an additional one 




13. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-22 (2012).
14. Frazier, 229 A.3d at 58.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Rivers v. Am. Com. Ins. Co., 836 A.2d 200, 204 (R.I. 2003)).
18. Id. at 59.
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hundred and twenty days to file suit directly against Liberty 
Mutual.19  Although Frazier timely filed his second complaint 
against Mita on November 2, 2016, Frazier did not substitute 
Liberty Mutual as the defendant until April 9, 2018, and thus did 
not timely file against it.20 
Although the Court conceded this point, the majority held that 
the savings statute does actually apply in these circumstances; 
thus, Frazier’s action against Liberty Mutual was in fact timely, 
and summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of 
Liberty Mutual.21  Liberty Mutual argued that the Court’s prior 
holding in Luft v. Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company of 
America,22 prevented the savings statute from applying to the facts 
at hand.23  In Luft, the Court held that “a savings statute could not 
be employed to extend the statute of limitations for actions against 
a party who was a ‘stranger to the original action.’”24  Notably, in 
Luft, the Court held that the defendant insurance company was a 
stranger to the original action, and, therefore, the savings statute 
could not be employed.25   
Here, however, the majority held that although they agree with 
the principle holding in Luft, eighty-nine years have since passed 
and “modern society and evolving jurisprudence present a different 
view” of whether an insurer like Liberty Mutual who makes an 
appearance on behalf of its insured is a “stranger” to the original 
action against its insured.26  The majority held that because the 
“insurance company and its insured are sufficiently linked, an 
insurance company is not, under these circumstances, a stranger to 
the original action against its insured.”27  The majority felt that this 
sufficient link between the insurer, Liberty Mutual, and its insured, 
Mita, was evident in the fact that Liberty Mutual employed lawyers 
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 61.  “We therefore agree with Frazier that the second trial
justice erred in holding that the savings statute did not apply to Frazier’s claim 
against Liberty Mutual.  Thus, it is our opinion that summary judgment should 
not have been granted in favor of Liberty Mutual.”  Id.   
22. Luft v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co, 155 A. 526 (1931).
23. Frazier, 229 A.3d at 59 (citing Luft, 155 A. at 527).
24. Id. (quoting Luft, 155 A. at 527).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 60.
27. Id.
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to ask the lower court to dismiss the original action against Mita, 
thus it “cannot be disputed that Liberty Mutual was aware of the 
lawsuit.”28  
The majority further rested their opinion on support from the 
Supreme Court of Iowa in Beilke v. Droz,29 where a plaintiff in a 
wrongful death action first sued the tortfeasor’s insurance company 
and then, upon dismissal, sued the alleged tortfeasor.30  The court 
in Beilke held that, although the plaintiff’s claim against the 
tortfeasor would be barred by the statute of limitations, the state’s 
saving statute preserved it.31  The court reasoned that “when a 
third party . . . obtain[s] judgment against the insured, the insurer 
must pay it to the extent of the policy limits,” thus the two share an 
identical interest.32  Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found 
the reasoning in Beilke persuasive and held that the “insurance 
company and its insured share a sufficient commonality of interest” 
because authorizing direct action against the insurance company 
“places the injured person precisely in the same position with 
relation to the insurer that the insured would have held had he paid 
the judgment and thereafter sought indemnity.”33  Thus, the two 
are sufficiently linked and within the reach of the savings statute.34 
Justice Indeglia authored a dissenting opinion in which he 
stressed the importance of adhering to stare decisis, specifically to 
the holding in Luft.35  Although Justice Indeglia wrote that he 
agreed with the majority’s “characterization” of the holding in Luft, 
he felt as though the majority was discarding precedent and was 
not appropriately considering the term “stranger.”36  Justice 
Indeglia argued that the Court’s jurisprudence and the plain 
meaning of the term “stranger” suggest that it should be 
interpreted as meaning someone who is not a party to the action 
which, in this case, includes Liberty Mutual.37 
28. Id.
29. Beilke v. Droz, 316 N.W.2d 912 (Iowa 1982).
30. Frazier, 229 A.3d at 60 (citing Beilke, 316 N.W.2d at 912).
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Beilke, 316 N.W.2d at 914).
33. Id. at 61.
34. Id.
35. Id. (Indeglia, J., dissenting).
36. See Id.
37. Id. at 63.
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COMMENTARY 
Prior to this decision, if a plaintiff failed to name the insurer in 
the original action, then the plaintiff could not bring suit against 
the insurer once the statute of limitations expired.  Pursuant to the 
Court’s holding, however,  now the plaintiff’s claim will be “saved” 
because an insurance company will likely never be considered to be 
a “stranger” to the original action.  On one hand, this allows 
plaintiffs to be made whole in circumstances under which they 
would not be able to otherwise and, as the majority notes, simply 
puts the insurer in the place it would be in had the insured sought 
indemnification later on.38  On the other hand, this decision could 
have negative impacts on consumers.  As Justice Indeglia points 
out in his dissent, the potential increase in liability of insurance 
companies could result in companies passing along the risk through 
higher rates to consumers.39   
Ultimately, this decision may not have a substantial impact at 
all as Rhode Island generally does not allow an injured party or 
their estate to bring an action directly against the alleged 
tortfeasor’s insurer unless service of process was non est inventus,40 
the alleged tortfeasor has filed for bankruptcy,41  or the alleged 
tortfeasor has died and probate has not yet been initiated.42  Thus, 
the practical implications of this decision—and whether it is helpful 
or harmful—are difficult to anticipate.   
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an insurer is not 
considered to be a “stranger” to an original action between an 
injured party and the insured where the insurer and the insured 
had a “sufficient commonality of interest.”  Thus, a claim by an 
injured party against the insurer that would normally fall to the 
statute of limitations can be saved by the state’s saving statute.  
 Madison C. Picard 
38. Id. at 61 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 63 (Indeglia, J., dissenting).
40. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2 (2013).
41. Id. § 27-7-2.4.
42. Id. § 27-7-2.
